Army DB Caleb Campbell

The Monkey and I have always maintained that disfunction is like poop; it always rolls downhill. When there is a flaw in leadership, it emanates through an organization like a sickness, making the entire organization fundamentally sick.

This idea holds true in the case of Army 2nd Lieutenant Caleb Campbell, who as the best football player to emerge from the Academy since QB Ronnie McAda, was drafted by the Detroit Lions in this year’s NFL draft, due to a change in Army policy that allowed military members with significant talents to be released from active military service.

Campbell’s selection by the Lions was both the feel-good story of the 2008 Draft (spectators in New York City, the site of the draft, broke out into raucous applause, chanting, “USA, USA!” when his name was called), and a point of controversy among many who felt that Campbell was shirking his duties and the Army sending a mixed message.

As a West Point graduate, I applauded and supported this policy by the Army and pick by the Lions in a blog post here, arguing that the benefit of recruiting new talent and inspiring young people and football fans alike would outweigh the cost of losing one soldier on the battlefield, as Campbell’s primary duty when not in football training would be to work as an Army recruiter and public face for the West Point athletic program.

Army QB Ronnie McAda, 1996

And in case you haven’t been keeping up with Army athletics lately, the West Point football program has strung together one of the lowest winning percentages in Division I college football over the last ten years, ever since the last time an Army player was drafted (Ronnie McAda), who led the team to a 10-2 record and bowl game appearance against Auburn in 1996.

But at its heart - this story isn’t about wininng percentages or boosting up ailing football programs or creating “feel-good” stories. It’s about living up to one’s word.

Duty, Honor, Country?

The Military Academy has a simple, three word motto: “Duty, Honor, Country,” which the greater Army has adopted at least unofficially. The problem is that the facts indicate that the expectation of living one’s life according to the principles of dedication to duty, adherence to honor, and love of country only go one way. The military expects its members to behave according to this immutable ethical code, yet has proven time and time again, especially within the context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, that this code doesn’t apply to the highest levels of the organization, doesn’t apply to the policy makers, spokespeople, and “deciders.”

Need proof? Campbell’s case is the most recent example. He fulfilled his duty, served and played with honor, and no one can doubt his love of country. By entering the NFL, he was simply adhering to a policy that in design would not only benefit himself personally, but the military, the NFL, and the nation as a whole. In a league often plagued by immaturity on the part of players, coaches, and management, imagine what kind of impact on the locker room and playing field a player with Campbell’s leadership training could have positively influenced.

If the Defense Department had a problem with the Army’s policy, they should have done something about it back in 2005, when the policy was first initiated. Changing the goal posts in the middle of the game is reneging a contract and a horrible display of integrity. And not only did the DoD breach a contract with an individual soldier, but they breached a contract with the Detroit Lions, who essentially squandered a valuable draft pick on a player who at the end of the day was deemed in eligible for play. There’s a real case for a lawsuit by the Lions against the military, although there’s no way in a million years their management would pursue such a tactic, as it would be a PR nightmare for them, while legally justified.

"Hero" Jessica Lynch "Rescued" by SF

Need more proof? The Jessica Lynch story is an embarrassing example. In the early days of the war, the military sold to the American public a made-for-Hollywood story about Jessica’s brave stand against her captors and subsequent Rambo-esque rescue by Special Forces. Only problem was that her one-woman stand against Iraqi soldiers was a fabrication and her rescue was staged. But the military sold the lie nonetheless, to trump up public support for the war and to put up a “pretty face” on what was quickly becoming an ugly affair (little did we know at the time of Jessica’s capture and rescue how ugly it would become - Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, & Haditha anyone?)

Army Rangers Pat & Kevin Tillman

But one of the most egregious examples of the “vacuum of honor” at the highest levels of the military (as well among several mid-level leaders), ironically also involves the NFL. And that is the sad story of Army Ranger Pat Tillman, former NFL star, who lost his life at the hands of his comrades in the hills of Afghanistan in 2005. Once again, the military brass sold an outright lie to the military, the American public, and most disgustingly, to the Tillman family. The facts of the case are frankly too heart-breaking to recount here, but again the military expects all from the rank and file but displays nothing but dishonesty when it really counts.

GWB Wearing A Ribbon Not Earned

I began by saying that poop rolls downhill. It is my belief that the lack of integrity among military leadership (and LET ME BE CLEAR - I AM NOT ASSAILING IN ANY WAY THE INTEGRITY OF THE BRAVE MEN AND WOMEN WHO SERVE ON THE FRONT LINES), flows through the organization from top to bottom. At the top of the poop pile is George W. Bush, Propagandist and Faker in Chief, who has surrounded himself with schemers and charlatans who have deprived this nation of its greatest treasures: its youth and its resources.

The military leadership has had so many opportunities to “make things right” over the course of these wars and its failures to live up to the core principles of DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY, in several notable examples undermines the progress and integrity of the men and women on the ground. The fact remains that achieving integrity will remain an energetic impossibility until integrity is restored to its highest offices.

RELATED POST: Army’s Caleb Campbell No Draft-Dodger

For most of us, Memorial Day is the “unofficial” first day of Summer: a time for family get togethers, trips to the beach, and afternoon barbecues. It’s usually nothing more than a three-day weekend bookending the summer with Labor Day on the other end, a brief respite from the workweek grind, soon forgotten come Tuesday morning.

Ironically, the last thing Memorial Day should be is a day to forget, as it is quite literally a day of remembrance, the only day that our nation officially sets aside to preserve the memories of those who have passed.

It is our tradition on this day to focus on those who have fallen while in the service of our nation. As a former military man, this day has greater significance for it causes me to remember comrades and friends who died while in the service of their country in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Today is also a day of gratitude. Gratitude for the selflessness of others and gratitude for my own health and safety. As luck and circumstances would have it, it was not my destiny to serve in battle. It is difficult to not feel some level of regret that others died while I got to enjoy my family and my freedom. However, my life and the freedoms I enjoy are the gifts of their service, gifts that I must remember to willingly receive, so as to not disregard their sacrifice.

On this day, I thought I’d briefly share my thoughts about three brothers in arms who have died in Iraq and Afghanistan. To my knowledge they are the only of my friends and former comrades who have died in battle. By remembering them today I hope to help their light to shine a bit longer. Through memory I can in my own way help them to live again.

JAMES F. ADAMOUSKI. CAPTAIN, AVIATION, US ARMY.

I last saw Jimmy on a training mission in Grafenwoehr, Germany, probably sometime in 1998 or 1999. I was a lieutenant assigned to the 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne and Jimmy was a helicopter pilot supporting our operations. As the Air Operations officer for the battalion, I was responsible for coordinating all of our fixed and rotary wing aircraft operations and couldn’t keep the smile off my face when I learned that my liaison to the helicopter company supporting us on a big air assault mission was none other than Jimmy Adamouski. Jimmy flew me all of over our training area during the month we were working together, which was a blast because I got to enjoy his incredible sense of humor and positive outlook on life while chatting with him on the radio headsets in his Blackhawk helicopter.

Jimmy and I were West Point classmates and I got to know him through one of my roommates who was a teammate with Jimmy on the Army soccer team. I think the one thing that most people would remember about Jimmy was his sense of humor. He was loose, open, and gregarious, and literally everybody loved him. He didn’t seem like your typical military type, and definitely not your typical Harvard type (Jimmy had been accepted to Harvard Business School just months before his death), which is probably why he was so successful in just about every thing he did. He wore life “like a loose garment,” a trait I to which I still aspire to this day.

After Jimmy’s death, I’ve often thought of those days in Germany flying in the back of his Blackhawk as a little gift I received before his passing on. Stealing time. Telling jokes with Jimmy while flying nap-of-the-earth over a simulated firefight is an experience like none other. We weren’t best friends while young cadets at West Point, but he sure treated me like one when when we reunited in Germany as “grown-up” lieutenants, and for that I am forever grateful. My heart goes out to his family, his wife, and his soccer teammates who were graced with an even larger experience of being close to Jimmy.

JOHN “HANS” KURTH. CAPTAIN, INFANTRY. US ARMY.

I first met Hans during the summer between Plebe (Freshman) and Yearling (Softmore) year while at West Point. We were in the same Field Training Company, and later he joined my former Academic Year Cadet Company, D-4. During our senior year, we picked the same branch: infantry, and along with about 200 hundred other West Point classmates, became brothers-in-arms for life.

I would describe Hans as extremely smart, extremely disciplined, and liked by all. He was a cadet Company commander while at West Point and enjoyed the respect of commissioned officers, classmates, and underclass cadets. He was also physically tough and very dependable.

What I loved about Hans was that he was a straight shooter. He was stable, grounded, and even tempered. (All qualities I aspire to). Although we never served together - he was assigned to the 82nd Airborne, while I went to Italy - I can only imagine the respect he must have enjoyed while leading men in combat in Iraq. My heart goes out to the young son he left behind, who I am sure will be a wonderful, humane, selfless man someday, just like his dad.

MICHAEL S. CURRY, FIRST SERGEANT, INFANTRY, US ARMY.

During my final year assigned to the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry in Vicenza, Italy, I was the Battalion Air Operations officer. Fortunately, I was backed up in this job by one of the most capable, intelligent, and well-liked non-commissioned officers in the battalion, Sergeant Mike Curry. Mike was a Ranger and Master Paratrooper, who had been lucky enough to serve multiple tours at the army’s premier duty station, Caserma Ederle, in the gorgeous town of Vicenza, Italy. Due to his incredible experience both as a paratrooper and as a soldier familiar with the huge logistics that go into running air operations out of a foreign country with volumous bureaucracy like Italy, he made my job quite frankly rather easy and most importantly, a whole lot of fun.

Mike had the intelligence, wit, and charisma to have easily been a commissioned officer himself, so I was often able to tag-team with him on a lot of the work that came across our desk. And as the only forward-deployed Airborne battlion in Europe, we were plenty busy. But Mike had a lightness with which he operated. He made things look easy and he rarely had his feathers ruffled.

The most remarkable aspect of his character was his sense of humor and zest for life, summed up in that enormous glowing smile of his. We had several running jokes and would greet each other in a uniquely profane way whenever we saw each other outside of the office and around post. Even though the customs of the military officially prevented us from “fraternizing,” I can proudly say that Mike Curry was my friend.

Mike leaves behind a beautiful Italian wife and several gorgeous children. I am saddened that his brilliant smile and easy charm no longer grace this world and the lives of those who loved him. He enriched me as a man and as an army officer and guided me to be a better leader. For that I am eternally grateful.

My interest is always piqued when another war film hits the theaters. As a cinemaphile, I’m concerned with seeing a well-conceived, researched, and executed story that creates a profound emotional response. As a former military man, I’m most concerned with “fidelity,” primarily in the portrayal of the military characters’ motivations, dialogue & lingo, and uniforms. From a technical perspective, I also like to see an accurate portrayal (or at least a valiant attempt of an accurate portrayal) of military hierarchy, customs, and operations.

I have some experience in the realm of technical accuracy in military films, serving as a military advisor for the film, “We Were Soldiers,” starring Mel Gibson. Oddly enough, my great-grandfather, with whom I share first and last names, was also a military advisor for several films in the 1950’s. Although neither of us obviously had any impact on the writing of the films we worked on, I can say with confidence that I feel good about doing my best to help create an accurate portrayal of the technical aspects of soldiering, including spending several weeks with the entire cast in a bootcamp environment, training them on the fundamentals of military weapons, tactics, jargon, and how to wear the uniform properly.

There has been a lot of talk in recent months about why recently released Iraq War films have failed to strike gold at the box office with American audiences. Here’s a look at the box office take from a recent slate of films (from the website www.cinematical.com):

In the Valley of Elah (2007) - $6.8 million.
Stop Loss (2008) - $10.6 million
Redacted (2007) - $.06 million.
Home of the Brave (2006) - $.04 million

The conventional wisdom is that we are overloaded with information about Iraq and would rather “escape” when we head to the theaters, rather than sit through a commentary on something that is happening in real time on the other side of the globe. One film critic, Betty Jo Tucker, put it this way:

Because information and/or visuals about the Iraq War and the War on Terror run almost 24/7 on television news, the internet and radio, we are less likely to pay money for a film about them.

To the first point, I couldn’t disagree more. Americans are fascinated with “reality.” The popularity and pervasiveness of Reality Television (another area in which I have professional experience) is a testament to this fact. (Although I will say that the word, “reality,” has taken on new meaning in recent years to imply a phenomenon - Reality TV - that resembles reality as a close facsimile, but actually bears few commonalities with the everyday waking experience we traditionally refer to as reality, but that’s another blog post entirely).

The other reason commonly offered to explain the lack of box office success of the recent Iraq films is that these films impart a negative portrayal of the war and American audiences would rather see a film that is inspiring or portrays American soldiers in a positive manner.

The second point has some legs but doesn’t tell the whole story as to why these films have been unsuccessful. Certainly, many of these films are telling a story that is not particularly sunny. The conflict itself isn’t a terribly happy affair, so I would argue that it would be nearly impossible to create light-hearted Iraq War films. But I don’t think Americans are looking for stories that are light-hearted and whimsical when it comes to this subject matter. In fact, understanding what are we are looking for when we go to the movies helps us understand why these films have been lackluster at the box office.

So what are we looking for at the movies, you ask? Primarily, it’s to be entertained. We call it the entertainment industry for a reason. In fact, I would argue that entertainment, in the form of movies, television, video games, the internet, and sports events, is one of our most important and valuable exports and one of the few things we continue to manufacture as a nation. Consider this: combining total entertainment revenues with advertising spending (a form of entertainment itself these days), Americans spent over ONE TRILLION DOLLARS on entertainment in 2007.

Let’s call a spade a spade: as a general rule, American filmmaking primarily serves as entertainment, not as art, and definitely not as political commentary. The artistry of film is a wonderful element in the presentation of the entertainment product, and certainly helps elevate entertaining fare into the realm artwork, but art is not the object of the vast majority of American film productions. And while very often social commentary is an intrinsic element of masterful American filmmaking, this element is not what initially brings people into theaters and inspires them to spread the word to others. Imagine this exchange taking place at the water cooler: “You’ve got to see this new movie Juno!” “Oh really, why?” “It really says a lot about the issues of reproductive rights, teenage pregnancy, and parenting!”

Instead, what we might actually hear is something like: “You have got to see Knocked Up, it’s freaking hilarious. I practically peed my pants!” That’s going to make me want to go see a movie. Later, when we’ve allowed the film to sink in, we might reflect on its nuances and its portrayal of the truths of becoming a parent for the first time that allow a film like this to transcend the comedy genre and enter into the realm of masterful America cinema. (Yeah, I said it. Masterful). This film works because it delivers the goods. It’s a comedy and it’s funny. Very simple. But this film exceeds just “working” and became a blockbuster because it not only delivered on the implied promise of the filmgoing experience - to entertain - but it also used that primary function of entertainment to open our minds to ideas that were identifiable in our own personal lives. It is this connection to the audience through our own personal identification, that is impossible without fidelity, without inherent truth, that makes a film great.

The lack of fidelity - which I referred to as “truth” in my review of the disappointing, “The Kingdom,” (which for some odd reason incorrectly gets lumped together with Iraq War films), combined with an absence of real entertainmnet value is the main culprit in the failures of recent Iraq War films to attract audiences. In short, Iraq movies haven’t succeeded financially because audiences aren’t interested in the overall subject matter; Iraq movies haven’t succeeded because they are simply bad movies, or at best, deeply flawed movies, or in the case of “In the Valley Elah,” arthouse fare that no one expected to take in $100 million at the box office.

“Redacted” is gimmicky, spiteful, and contains comically poor acting. Throw in an incredibly depressing subject matter - the rape of a young Iraqi girl by American soldiers - and you have a recipe for failure. The hack Brian De Palma’s “Casualties of War” was equally God-awful. “The Home of the Brave” is just plain bad - a soap opera-ish and melodramatic foray into the War genre with disastrous results.

I would like to spend a moment on the MTV Films recent release, “Stop Loss,” about an Iraq War vet who falls victim to the Army’s actual policy of “stop-lossing” soldiers in order to remedy their manpower shortages, whereby soldiers are forced to continue military service, even after they have honorably served their initial enlistment. I had a personal interest in this film because I myself was involuntarily recalled to serve in Iraq (illegally, it turned out) through a different “backdoor draft” program involving the Army’s Inactive Ready Reserve. But that’s a story for another time.

Getting back to the film, “Stop Loss,” the beginning of the film, in which we experience a sequence featuring Ryan Phillipe’s squad of soldiers on an operation in Iraq is promising, in that it is tense, exciting, scary, and ultimately entertaining. When the men return home, scarred physically and emotionally, the film takes on even greater tension when Phillipe’s character is informed that he won’t be getting out like he had planned. Instead, he’s been “stop-lossed,” and reassigned back into another unit that is returning to combat in Iraq. Believing this to be wrong and a violation of his enlistment contract, he makes a split-second decision to go on the run, ostensibly to seek help from his Senator in Washington, DC. Inexplicably, the girlfriend of his best friend and fellow soldier (wonderfully played by Chatum Tanning), decides to go on the lam with him, creating all sorts of tension between the two men when word gets back to the unit. The film then becomes a “road movie,” with several pitstops along the way in which Phillipe meets with the family of a soldier who died on his watch, runs into another soldier on the run, and reunites with an injured vet recovering from multiple amputations at an Army hospital somewhere.

The refrain we hear over an over again from Phillipe’s mouth is that this policy is wrong, that he served honorably while he was in, and that as a matter of principle, he can no longer serve. His options are few - either turn himself in and be subject to possible punishment for going AWOL, stay on the run, or utilize the services of a New York lawyer to emigrate to Canada - for good.

***SPOILER WARNING***: Besides degrading the film’s integrity through some pretty ridiculous time lapses, plot holes, and Herculean logistical feats (driving from New York City to Texas in what seems like a blink of an eye), director Kimbery Peirce degrades the integrity of her main character’s intentions by causing him to make decisions that contradict everything he has stood for throughout the movie. After spending the entire film lambasting the Army’s stop-loss policy and nearly sacrificing everything - his family, his reputation, his citizenship, his best friend - he decides in the last instant to abandon that line of thinking and return to duty in the final scene of the film, jumping on the bus with his band of brothers to head back off to Iraq. Why did we subject ourselves to his excellent adventure and his pontifications upon the flaws of our country’s war policies? We may not have agreed with Phillipe’s character, but at least he stood up for something. His last minute change of heart undermines the “fidelity” that the filmmaker worked so hard to create over the previous two hours. Perhaps he ultimately decides to stand up for his buddies and return to go fight with them, instead of standing up for his own view of right and wrong. Perhaps he abandons the desires of the self for the desires of the “greater good,” i.e. the safety and welfare of his men. Perhaps. And that’s an interesting dilemma for sure. But when you spend the whole movie arguing for the other side of the coin and then turn 180 degrees in the closing seconds of the film, the effect is to try to have it both ways and ultimately stand up for nothing. The filmmaker didn’t have the courage to allow her character to follow through on his convictions.

***END SPOILER ALERT***: The key to understanding the box office failure of this film is to realize that standing up for something and then failing to follow through on that conviction until the bitter end is inherently not entertaining. We are inspired by the courage of others, even when that courage involves doing something that might be unpopular. In the case of “Stop Loss,” the film is already at a disadvantage because although the Iraq War is incredibly unpopular, we as film going audiences still want to be entertained and lifted up. If an Iraq War film is to be financially successful, it needs to find a way to be entertaining to the core and ultimately inspiring. Take Oscar-winning film, “Platoon,” for example. It’s about an extremely unpopular war, it portrays the film in a predominately negative light, but at the end, even though Willem Dafoe’s Elias is ostensibly murdered by Tom Berenger’s Barnes in the closing moments, all the while Charlie Sheens’ Chris Taylor’s innocence is forever lost - we are ulimately inspired and moved by Elias’ final sacrifice. He didn’t have to do it and it was an arguably futile death, but he fulfilled his charactor’s destiny and fidelity by remaining noble until the bitter end.

It’s a shame “Stop Loss” isn’t good because it does raise important social and political issues. Channing Tatum is excellent in the film and Ryan Phillipe, despite the limitations of the script, did as best he could with the material provided. Despite the failures of the storyline, the director Kimberly Peirce did a decent job of accurately capturing the essence of being a young soldier, as the men in “Stop Loss,” were clearly taught, in the immortal words of “Stripes” Sgt. Hulka: “to eat, sleep, walk, talk, shoot, shit like a United States soldier.”

This week Congress was graced by the appearances of General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who both testified as to the current state of affairs in Iraq. Much was made of the fact that all three presidential candidates got an opportunity to sit in the spotlight and question the General and Ambassador directly, as well as make proclamations as to their current stand on the matter. There were few surpises on that count: McCain came across as a cheerleader, Clinton a thoughtful, perhaps reluctant hawk, and Obama the most deeply grounded in reality (the war was a mistake; we’re making our fight with al Qaeda worse by persisting in Iraq).

There was no surpise that a familiar theme kept popping up during the discussion: whether or not the “Surge” was working, and whether or not current troop levels should be maintained. John McCain has made his support of the Surge the cornerstone of his national defense and foreign policy experience, and his pitch goes like this: “I supported the surge from the beginning. The surge is working. I supported a policy that is working, so therefore I am a smart and capable leader, worthy of your vote for President.”

Depending on how you measure “success,” McCain may be right when he says that the Surge is working. If one simply assesses American casualties combined with the overall levels violence in Iraq, there is some evidence to suggest that the Surge has contributed to these positive developments (although the fact that influencial cleric Muqtada al-Sadr ordered a ceasefire to his Mahdi Army in August 2007 may have made an equal, if not greater, impact on the levels of violence than the Surge itself).

On the other hand, if you measure success of the Surge as less of a function of bodycount and more of a function of real economics, there is an alternate view of the reality on the ground, explained in this interesting paper, in which MIT’s Michael Greenstone considers:

“the central question of whether the Surge has increased or diminished the prospect of today’s Iraq surviving into the future…[he] examine[s] the price of Iraqi state bonds, which the Iraqi government is currently servicing, on world financial markets. After the Surge, there is a sharp decline in the price of those bonds, relative to alternative bonds. The decline signaled a 40% increase in the market’s expectation that Iraq will default. This finding suggests that to date the Surge is failing to pave the way toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it.”

Examining the problem in Iraq from the perspective of real economics, rather than from platitudes and politics, is a refreshing view, yet neither of these views really address a true way out for America. Measuring success in Iraq by way of the Surge is a useless exercise because whether or not the Surge is working is really irrelevant to the actual quagmire we face.

In other words, assessing the Surge is a “false dilemma” that actually entraps those of us who attempt to consider it. For example, during the Democratic debates it became conventional wisdom that the Surge was working for the above reasons (diminished overall violence in Iraq). As this idea was now accepted as fact, questioners would pose a question similiar to the following to the candidates: “So you were against the Surge. Now that the Surge is working, doesn’t your lack of support for the Surge in the first place indicate your lack of expertise on how to best “win” the war in Iraq?”

Time and time again, the Democratic candidates would fall prey to this not so veiled attack, hemming and hawing on the question, feeling “had,” attempting to sidestep a chink in their armor. Meanwhile, on the Republican side, John McCain received multiple opportunities to look like a military and foreign policy genius when the issue of Iraq came up, pointing to the “success” of the Surge as an indicator of the “impending, inevitable” victory in Iraq.

My point about the irrelevance of the Surge can be explained succinctly by looking back at the roots of the problems we face in Iraq. Notwithstanding the blatantly obvious conclusion that the war was a mistaken idea, “planned” myopically, and executed incompetently, let’s exclude for a moment our reasons for going into the war, and instead focus on our strategy for achieving success. Early in the planning, it has been widely acknowledged that then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shenseki called for much higher troop levels in the initial invasion. He called for nearly half a million. Rumsfeld and company denied that request and sent a paltry 150,000 soldiers or so, nearly ensuring the quagmire we currently face. (Oh by the way, they also fired Shenseki for his groundedness with reality. I personally met Shenseki on two occassions and can attest to his intelligence, charisma, and leadership. The first time was in 1987 when he was a full Colonel and assumed the command the 2nd Brigade of the Third Infantry Division from my father in Kitzingen, Germany. The second time I was a senior at West Point and had the pleasure of hosting him during his visit to the Academy when he was commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. It is arguable that if his advice were heeded, the current situation in Iraq would be immeasurably better, and possibly would no longer involved active engagment by US combat forces a full five years after the initial invasion).

Given that we sent in less than a third of the required forces to secure a country of 27 million people, it goes without saying that if we increase troop levels in Iraq that the security situation will improve. This is not rocket science. But merely improving the “security situation” does not solve our problems in Iraq. The most fundamental problems in Iraq are internal - concerning the relentless fighting between Sunnis and Shiites - followed by the fact that our presence is only emboldening the “resistance,” and will continue to do so until we either completely squash all opposition, which would involve a monumental increase in both troop levels and overall spending on the war, or massively reduce our presence entirely.

It is my belief that no one in Congress and no Presidential candidate truely possesses the courage and resolve to end this war on favorable terms. General William Tecumseh Sherman had it right when he opined that “War is Hell,” and proceeded to unleash unspeakable violence on the wayward Confederates states until they acquieced. The same holds true in Iraq. No positive solution will emerge through relatively minor troop increases that the Surge is all about. Sending an additional ten or twenty thousand soldiers to Iraq may quell some violence but will not solve the problem. If we truly want to “win” the war, we must initiate a draft, muster an army of at least half a million, and impose our will on an uncooperative Iraqi populace. It will cost many trillions of dollars and at least a half a decade.

Of course the alternative to this strategy is to abandon politically-fueled discussions about triffling troop increases and simply cut our losses and redeploy our forces from the region. Perhaps work in some political cooperation with the neighboring countries, and refocus our attention towards salvaging the situation in Afghanistan and battling the “real” al Qaeda, instead of “al Qaeda in Iraq,” which is more of a resistance group that an actual network of global terrorists, as we commonly purport al Qaeda to be.